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The Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") requires full and fair 
disclosure of the nature of securities sold in interstate and foreign 
commerce.1 Section 11 of the Securities Act prohibits false or mis­
leading registration statements. It also provides buyers a private rem­
edy for false or misleading statements against any signer of the regis­
tration statement, any partner or director of the issuer, any 
professional involved in preparing or certifying the statement, and any 
underwriter.2 The rule appears simple: if there is a material mis­
statement or omission in the registration statement, the buyer may sue 
the seller.3 
Courts disagree, however, over how a section 11 plaintiff must 
plead his or her claim.4 Because neither fraud nor mistake is an ele-
1. See H.R. 5480, 73d Cong.§ 1 (1933); see also H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1-5 (1933); JACK 
S. ELLENBERGER & ELLEN P. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 
1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973) (containing copies of original docu­
mentation regarding the Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1994) (codifying section 11 of the Securities Act). 
3. Although Congress did not define the term "material" for the purposes of determin­
ing whether there has been a material misstatement or omission under the Securities Act, 
the Supreme Court has held that a fact is material if "a reasonable shareholder would con­
sider it important in making an investment decision or if there is a substantial likelihood that 
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as 
having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available." TSC Indus. v. 
Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). The Securities & Exchange Commission ("SEC") has 
incorporated that definition into its regulations. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1994). 
4. See U.S. Supreme Court: Supreme Court refuses to review procedural challenge to suit 
over !PO, SEC. L. DAILY, June 16, 1998. In the 1997 NationsMart case, the defendants (the 
corporation, its officers and directors, and its underwriters) beseeched the Supreme Court to 
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ment of a section 11 claim, courts have applied the liberal notice 
pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce­
dure.5 Rule 8( a)(2) states that a plaintiff must plead only "a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to re­
lief."6 
The fear of strike suits, which are groundless claims filed as a pre­
text for discovery in order to induce settlement, has led some courts to 
interpret the Federal Rules more stringently.7 To dissuade potential 
plaintiffs or to dispose of more complaints at the pleading stage, these 
courts have required securities plaintiffs to plead their claims with par­
ticularity under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 
Rule 9(b) provides "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circum­
stances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. 
Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person 
may be averred generally."9 
resolve the existing disagreement among circuits over whether the heightened pleading 
standard of Rule 9(b) applies to section 11 complaints. The district court originally dis­
missed the case, in part, because the plaintiffs (stock purchasers) did not plead fraud with 
particularity. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, stating that "Rule 9(b) 
does not apply to claims under § 11 of the Securities Act, because proof of fraud or mistake 
is not a prerequisite to establishing liability under § 11." Carlon v. Thaman (In re 
NationsMart Sec. Litig.), 130 F.3d 309, 314 (8th Cir. 1997). 
5. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Crazie Eddie, 702 F. Supp. 962, 973 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (" Section 
11 violations need not be pleaded ... with the particularity required of fraud claims gov­
erned by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires that 'averments of fraud or 
mistake' be stated 'with particularity.' . .. Plaintiffs need only comply with Rule B(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by setting forth a 'short and plain statement of the 
claim.' "); see also 69 A AM. JUR. 2d Securities Regulation § 1490 (1993). The only instance 
where fraud is a factor under section 11 is with respect to a defendant 's right to contribution 
from other parties who are liable for the misstatement or omission. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 
77k(f)(l) (1994) ("Every person who becomes liable to make any payment under this section 
may recover contribution ... from any person who ... would have been liable to make the 
same payment, unless the person who has become liable was, and the other was not, guilty of 
fraudulent misrepresentation."). 
6. FED. R. Crv. P. 8(a)(2). 
7. See, e.g., Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1100 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying FED. R. CIV. 
P. 9(b) to a section 11 claim); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 
741 (1975) (expressing concern that strike suits, which take up the time of a large number of 
people in the hopes of increasing the settlement value, represent "a social cost rather than a 
benefit"). 
8. See Melder, 27 F.3d at 1100 (applying FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b) to a section 11 claim 
"grounded in fraud" and noting that "the heightened pleading standard provides defendants 
with fair notice of the plaintiff's claims, protects defendants from harm to their reputation 
and goodwill, reduces the number of strike suits, and prevents plaintiffs from filing baseless 
claims then attempting to discover unknown wrongs" (quoting Tuchman v. D S C  Communi­
cations Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
9. FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b). Averments of mistake occur only infrequently. This Note, 
therefore, will only address the relationship between section 11 and claims of fraud. See 
Bankers Trust Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 959 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir. 1992) (collecting a 
mere two cases in the last fifty years in which a court dismissed a complaint for failure to 
plead mistake with particularity); 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL 
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The courts that have addressed whether section 11 plaintiffs must 
plead according to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) have 
taken three approaches: (1) Rule 9(b) does not apply to any section 
11 claims;10 (2) Rule 9(b) applies to only those section 11 claims that 
are "grounded in fraud";11 and (3) Rule 9(b) applies to all section 11 
claims.12 Whether a section 11 plaintiff must plead his or her claim in 
accordance with Rule 9(b) affects a buyer's substantive rights under 
the securities laws and interferes with the regulatory scheme of the se­
curities markets established by Congress.13 
This Note argues that Rule 9(b) does not apply to claims filed un­
der section 11 of the Securities Act, regardless of whether the claim "is 
grounded in fraud." Instead, section 11 plaintiffs must comply only 
with the liberal notice pleading standard stated in Rule 8(a)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Part I argues that Congress inten­
tionally set a low burden for section 11 plaintiffs because the purpose 
of the Securities Act is to protect purchasers of securities. The text, 
history, and purpose of the Securities Act, as well as the text and pur­
pose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, support imposing mini­
mal pleading requirements on section 11 plaintiffs. Because securities 
lawsuits often contain claims under both section 11 of the Securities 
Act and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Ex-
PRACTICE 3d, § 9.03[2] (1999). Furthermore, I have found no securities case that was 
dismissed for failure to plead mistake with particularity. 
10. See Carlon v. Thaman (In re NationsMart Sec. Litig.), 130 F.3d 309, 314 (8th Cir. 
1997). While the Second Circuit has not specifically addressed the issue, several district 
courts in the Second Circuit have held that Rule 9(b) does not apply to section 11 claims. 
See, e.g., Feiner v. SS&C Tech., 11 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Conn. 1998); In re In-Store Adver. 
Sec. Litig., 878 F. Supp. 645, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Nelson v. Paramount Comm., Inc. 872 F. 
Supp. 1242, 1246 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Ann Taylor Stores Sec. Litig., 807 F. Supp. 990, 1003 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
11. See Anderson v. Clow (In re Stac Elec. Sec. Litig.), 89 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1994); Melder, 27 F.3d at 1097 {5th Cir. 
1994); Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1992). These courts generally find 
that because plaintiffs incorporate section 11 and section lO(b) claims in the same complaint 
based on the same facts, both claims necessarily sound in fraud. See Shapiro, 964 F.2d at 287 
{"Although Count II does not allege fraudulent intent or recklessness (a prerequisite to a 
successful fraud claim), neither does it allege negligence."). On the other hand, some courts 
have recognized that applying Rule 9{b) to section 11 claims accomplishes nothing except 
eliminating fraud from the complaint. See, e.g. , NationsMart, 130 F.3d at 314. 
12 See Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889 {7th Cir. 1990) {holding that Rule 9{b) applies to 
section 12{2) of the Securities Act, but not distinguishing between negligent or fraudulent 
clainls); see also NationsMart, 130 F.3d at 315 (citing to Sears when discussing whether to 
apply Rule 9{b) to a section 11 claim even though Sears dealt with section 12(2)). Like sec­
tion 11, section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act creates a private cause of action against sellers 
for material misstatements or omissions in registration statements. Section 12{a){2), how­
ever, has been strictly limited by the loss causation defense in section 12(b) and the Supreme 
Court's finding in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 {1995) that section 12(a)(2) does 
not apply to secondary transactions or private offerings. 
13. See infra notes 21-23, 40-43 and accompanying text. 
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change Act"),14 Part II posits that differences in statutory language 
and policy goals in these sections mandate applying a lower pleading 
standard to claims filed under section 11 than to those filed under sec­
tion lO(b).15 This Note concludes that Rule 8(a)(2) should apply to 
section 11 claims because applying the heightened requirements of 
Rule 9(b) would undermine section ll's inducement to carefully pre­
pare registration statements in order to inform buyers of the character 
of securities.16 
I. SECTION 11 PLACES A MINIMAL BURDEN ON PLAINTIFFS 
The statutory language and legislative history of the Securities Act 
indicate that Congress intended to minimize plaintiffs' burden of 
pleading under section 11. Section I.A argues that because section 11 
does not specifically mention fraud or mistake, Rule 9(b) does not ap­
ply. Section I.B recounts the historical facts that prompted Congress 
to enact the Securities Act and argues that the purpose behind the Se­
curities Act and section 11 in particular support a minimal pleading 
standard. Section I.C analyzes the purpose of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and concludes that because the policy reasons sup­
porting Rule 9(b) do not apply to section 11 claims, such claims should 
be pleaded in accordance with Rule 8(a)(2). 
A. Statutory Language of Section 11 
Because the text of section 11 imposes a minimal burden on the 
buyer, it would contravene congressional intent to read the heightened 
pleading standard of Rule 9(b) into section 11 claims. This Section ar­
gues that there are two reasons on the face of the statute to apply the 
notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) to section 11 claims. First, 
because the plain language of section 11 does not include fraud or mis­
take as an element of the claim, the heightened pleading standard of 
Rule 9(b) does not apply; and therefore, by default, the liberal notice 
pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) applies. Second, section ll's inap­
posite treatment of buyers and sellers also supports imposing the lib­
eral notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) on section 11 plaintiffs. 
14. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696 {3d Cir. 1996). Section lO{b) of 
the Exchange Act provides civil liability for fraudulent statements in connection with the 
sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78j{b) {1994). 
15. Initially, judges unilaterally applied the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b) 
to section lO(b) claims. See Westinghouse, 90 F.3d at 710-14. Congress mandated the appli­
cation of Rule 9(b) to section lO(b) claims in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
("PSLRA"). 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4 {1934). 
16. See DAVID L. RA1NER & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 251 (5th ed. 1996). 
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The plain language of section 11 supports requiring a plaintiff to 
comply with the more liberal notice pleading standard because section 
11 does not include fraud or mistake as an element of the claim. 
When interpreting a statute, the Supreme Court has instructed lower 
courts that "[w]here . . .  resolution of a question of federal law turns 
on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statu­
tory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory lan­
guage is unclear.m7 In this case, the Federal Rules and the statute are 
clear. 18 Rule 9(b) imposes a heightened pleading standard in only two 
instances: averments of fraud or mistake.19 Because section 11 in­
cludes neither of these, it does not fall within the scope of Rule 9(b ) .20 
To plead a claim under section 11, the plaintiff must allege the 
following: (1) that the registration statement contained a misstate­
ment or omission when it became effective; (2) that the misstatement 
or omission was material; and (3) that the plaintiff purchased the secu­
rity pursuant to such statement.21 After establishing a prima fade 
case, the plaintiff may recover damages.22 The plaintiff must also 
comply with the statute of limitations.23 
17. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984), quoted in United States v. Rozet, No. C 
97-1704 SC, 1998 WL 838888, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1998); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) ("The starting point in every case involving 
construction of a statute is the language itself."). 
18. The effort to create the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure began in 1911, but the 
Rules were not written until the 1930s and did not become effective until 1938. See § 62 
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (5th ed. 1994) 426-32, 760. The fact that 
the Securities Act predated the effective date of the Federal Rules should not impact the 
application of the Federal Rules to civil actions filed under the Securities Act. Although the 
Enabling Act of 1934 declares that the rules regulate only "practice and procedure" and do 
not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive rights," 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b) (1988), the 
Supreme Court has consistently upheld all rules challenged before it. See, e.g., Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 312 U.S. 1, 85 (1941). These cases 
support applying Rule 8(a)(2) to section 11 claims because application of Rule 9(b) would 
change the substance of section 11 by requiring a plaintiff to prove more than required to 
recover under the Act. See, e.g., In re First Merchants Acceptance Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 97-
C2715, 1998 WL 781118, at *11 n.6. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 1998) ("It is illogical to require plain­
tiffs to plead more than they would have to prove to succeed on a § 11 claim standing 
alone."). · 
19. FED. R. CN. P. 9(b). 
20. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994). 
21. Id.; see also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) (setting 
forth the elements of a prima facie case under section 11). In contrast, to state a claim under 
section lO(b) of the Exchange Act, every plaintiff must plead both scienter and reliance. 15 
u.s.c. § 78j (1994). 
22. Damages are usually equal to the difference between the price paid for security by 
the plaintiff and the value of the security at the time the section 11 claim was brought. See 
15 U.S.C. § 77k( e) (1994); see also Beecher v. Able, 435 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
23. Section 13 of the Securities Act provides the statute of limitations applicable to sec­
tion 11 claims. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1994) (providing for a statutory limitations period of one 
year after discovery of the misstatement or omission, or after discovery should have been 
made by the exercise of reasonable diligence, but in no event can a section 11 action be 
brought more than three years after the security was "bona fide offered to the public"). 
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Whether the claim is "grounded in fraud" should not affect what a 
section 11 plaintiff must plead in the complaint. By definition, fraud is 
"a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a mate­
rial fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment."24 Section 11 
does not require proof of scienter or reliance;25 therefore, it is mean­
ingless to distinguish cases upon whether or not they are "grounded in 
fraud." Allegations of fraud would be mere surplusage and could be 
deleted from the complaint by the plaintiff before filing the complaint, 
or by the court upon a motion to dismiss, without affecting the plain­
tiff's substantive claim.26 Even if a court dismissed the allegations of 
fraud from the plaintiff's complaint for failure to plead with particu­
larity under Rule 9(b ), the heart of a plaintiff's section 11 claim- that 
the registration statement contained false or misleading information 
- should not be dismissed.27 
Because section 11 does not require a showing of fraud or mistake, 
applying Rule 9(b) to section 11 claims conflicts with judicial interpre­
tation of the notice pleading standard under the Federal Rules.28 In 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination 
Unit,29 the Supreme Court explicitly limited the scope of Rule 9(b) and 
stated that courts cannot add to the Federal Rules merely for policy 
reasons.30 In that case, the Court acknowledged the fact that "[t]he 
Federal Rules do address in Rule 9(b) the question of the need for 
greater particularity in pleading certain actions."31 The Court went on 
24. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 670 {7th ed. 1999). 
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994). 
26. See Carlon v. Thaman (In re NationsMart Sec. Litig.), 130 F.3d 309, 315 (8th Cir. 
1997). 
27. Seeid. 
28. See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 {1963) {favoring "an 
analysis which reconciles the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather 
than holding one completely ousted"), quoted in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 
U.S. 375, 387 n.23 (1983). 
29. 507 U.S. 163 {1993). 
30. See id. at 168 {discussing municipal liability under section 1983). But see Cash 
Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F. Supp. 892, 900 {D. Mass. 1991) (applying Rule 9{b) to a 
CERCLA claim because of the severe consequences of environmental liability and the ex­
pense of defending a non-meritorious claim). After Leatherman, courts have read Rule 9(b) 
more narrowly. See, e.g., Warwick Admin. Group v. Avon Products, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 116, 
121 {S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that "in light of the Leatherman decision, we hold that a height­
ened pleading standard does not apply to CERCLA cases"); United States v. Azrael, 774 F. 
Supp. 376, 380 {D. Md. 1991) (declining to follow Cash Energy and applying Rule 8(a)(2) to 
a CERCLA claim). In addition, the "recent tendency in some courts to revive fact pleading 
in an effort to cope with increased litigation . . .  [is] inconsistent with the spirit of the federal 
rules." CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 5 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1298 (2d ed. 1990). 
31. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168 (holding that homeowners, who brought a civil rights 
action against municipal officials claiming that a search of their homes for illegal drugs vio­
lated the Fourth Amendment, did not need to comply with the heightened pleading standard 
because courts may impose the heightened pleading standard only in circumstances consti-
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to say, "perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, [additional 
claims] might be subjected to the added specificity requirement of 
Rule 9(b)."32 But because Rule 9(b) applies a heightened pleading 
standard only to averments of fraud or mistake and not to cases in­
volving a material misstatement or omission, it should not be ex­
panded to apply to section 11 claims.33 
An analysis of the treatment of buyers and sellers under section 11 
further supports a minimal pleading standard for section 11 plaintiffs. 
Section 11 treats buyers and sellers differently by mandating minimal 
requirements for a plaintiff's prima facie case, but requiring strict 
compliance with the Securities Act's disclosure provisions and reason­
able investigation for a defendant to raise an affirmative defense.34 
Congress made it easy for buyers to bring a claim under section 11. 
To state a claim, a buyer must allege that he purchased a security from 
a seller pursuant to a registration statement containing a material mis­
statement or omission.35 A buyer does not have to establish reliance, 
which means that the buyer need not have relied upon the registration 
statement or even have seen the registration statement to collect dam­
ages.36 Because section 11 does not include a scienter requirement, a 
tuting fraud or mistake). The Court held that Rule 9(b) did not apply to complaints alleging 
municipal liability under section 1983 because to state a claim under that section, a plaintiff 
must allege only that a person deprived him of a federal right while that person was acting 
under color of state or territorial law. 42 U .S.C.A. § 1983 (1994). 
32 Leatherman, 501 U.S. at 168. 
33. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 n.18 (quoting Lewis Carroll's 
advice on the construction of language in LEWIS CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass, in 
THE COMPLETE WORKS OF LEWIS CARROLL 196 (1939): " 'When I use a word,' Humpty 
Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean - neither 
more nor less.' "). 
34. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) (stating that sec­
tion 11 "places a relatively minimal burden on a plaintiff''); see also id. at 383 (stating that 
the liability for the issuer of a materially misleading registration statement is "virtually ab­
solute, even for innocent misstatements" and that anyone else who signed the registration 
statement must prove, after reasonable investigation, that he or she had reasonable grounds 
to believe the statement was not materially misleading (footnotes omitted)); H.R. REP. No. 
73-85, supra note 1, at 9 (statement of Rep. Samuel Rayburn) (indicating that "[t]he provi-
sions throwing upon the defendant in suits under sectionO 11 .. . the burden of proof to ex-
empt himself are indispensable to mak[ing] the buyer's remedies . . .  effective"). 
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(a) (1994). If contested, the plaintiff must also establish that he 
brought his claim within the statute of limitations. As noted in Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 
685 (1st Cir. 1978): 
[I]t is the general rule in the federal courts that, when the very statute which creates the 
cause of action also contains a limitation period, the statute of limitations not only bars the 
remedy but also destroys the liability, and therefore the plaintiff must plead and prove facts 
showing that he is within the statute. This view has been consistently followed under the Se­
curities Act. 
Id. at 695 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
36. Even if a person purchases the security after it has been made generally available to 
the public, the added requirement of proof of reliance on the untrue statement in the regis­
tration statement "may be established without proof of the reading of the registration state-
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buyer may recover damages for an innocent misstatement or omis­
sion.37 Representative Sam Rayburn emphasized the importance of 
the absence of a scienter requirement in the legislative history of the 
Securities Act when he stated that, "[e]very lawyer knows that with all 
the facts in the control of the [seller] it is practically impossible for a 
buyer to prove a state of knowledge or a failure to exercise due care 
on the part of the [seller]."38 Therefore, it would be unreasonable to 
require a buyer to plead with particularity if the buyer did not even 
have to read the registration statement to recover in the first place.39 
In addition, Congress granted buyers procedural control over sec­
tion 11 litigation. First, a buyer can elect to bring a section 11 claim in 
law or equity.4 0 While the damages sought usually command the deci­
sion between law and equity, the choice effectively grants the buyer 
the choice of trial by judge or jury.4 1 A buyer also has the option of 
suing in federal or state court.4 2 Moreover, under an express exception 
to the general removal statute, a seller may not remove a section 11 
claim from state to federal court.4 3 Sellers should not be able to un­
dermine buyers' ability to bring their claims in the most favorable ju­
risdiction by easily having a section 11 claim dismissed for failure to 
plead with particularity. 
The statutory language shows that Congress did not want a seller 
to be able to evade the disclosure regime of the Securities Act because 
the buyer did not comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 
9(b ).4 4 Congress divided "sellers" into two categories: the issuer and 
ment by such person." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994); see also III LOUIS Loss, SECURmES 
REGULATION, 1752 (2d ed. 1961) (stating that section 11 enables a plaintiff to establish reli­
ance "without proof of the plaintiff's reading" of the registration statement). This rule 
makes perfect sense if one accepts the "efficient market hypothesis (EMH). " The EMH 
says that the price of a security inlmediately reflects all disclosed information about the secu­
rity. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Em· 
pirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). Therefore, if an issuer discloses a material misstatement 
of information, the price of the security will reflect this misinformation. The purchaser will 
pay an unfair price regardless of whether or not she has read the registration statement. 
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994); see also, e.g. , Anderson v. Clow (In re Stac Blee. Sec. 
Litig.), 89 F.3d 1399, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996). 
38. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 1, at 9 (statement of Rep. Sam Rayburn). 
39. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that there is 
a concern regarding unfair dismissals for failure to plead with particularity in cases where the 
defendant has exclusive possession of the facts). 
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(v) (1994) (providing that claims may be brought "in equity [or] at 
law . . .  to enforce any liability or duty created by this subchapter"). 
41. See 69A AM. JUR. 2d, Securities Regulations§ 1053 (1993). 
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1994); Thomas Lee Hazen, Allocation of Jurisdiction Be­
tween the State and Federal Courts for Private Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 
60 N.C. L. REV. 707 (1982). 
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1994). 
44. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 1, at 9 (statement of Rep. Sam Rayburn). 
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everyone else involved in preparing the registration statement.45 First, 
the Supreme Court has held that liability of the issuer is virtually ab­
solute.46 Near absolute liability forces the issuer to assume responsi­
bility for all misstatements or omissions because "to impose a lesser 
responsibility would nullify the purpose of [the Securities Act]," which 
is to ensure full disclosure of securities to the public.47 Second, other 
individuals preparing or signing the registration statement may ab­
solve themselves of liability only by demonstrating that he or she did 
not know or could not have discovered, through the exercise of rea­
sonable care, that the registration statement contained a material mis­
statement or omitted a material fact.48 The Congressional Record 
noted that "[u]nless responsibility is to involve merely paper liability it 
is necessary to throw the burden of disproving responsibility for rep­
rehensible acts of omission or commission on those who purport to is­
sue statements for the public's reliance."49 The text of section 11, as 
well as the legislative history, clearly places the burden of providing 
disclosure and proving exemption on the seller, not the buyer; and 
therefore, the liberal notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) should 
apply to buyers' claims under section 11. 
B. History and Purpose of the Securities Act 
The legislative history of the Securities Act supports imposing 
minimal pleading requirements on section 11 plaintiffs. Section LB 
argues that the impetus for the creation of the Securities Act and sec­
tion 11, as well as the combined purpose of the Securities Act and sec­
tion 11, support applying the liberal notice pleading requirements of 
Rule 8(a)(2) to section 11 claims. 
The events precipitating the enactment of the Securities Act un­
derscore the significance of the protection of buyers through the civil 
liability provisions of the Act, induding section 11. In response to 
these conditions, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress en­
acted the Securities Act of 1933 to restore the public's confidence in 
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994). 
46. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983). The issuer may 
not avail himself of the statutory defenses enumerated in section ll(b). See Escott v. 
Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Therefore, the issuer is 
limited to the common law defenses of plaintiff's knowledge, lack of materiality, or tolling of 
the statute of limitations. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION§ 7.4 (3d ed. 1995). Note that materiality is a jury question and therefore the 
issuer cannot use the lack-of-materiality defense at the pleading stage. See TSC Indus. Inc. 
v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450-53 (1976). 
47. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 1, at 10 (statement of Rep. Sam Rayburn). 
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(b) (1994). The standard of reasonableness is "that required of 
a prudent man in the management of his own property." 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)( c) (1994). 
49. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 1, at 9 (statement of Rep. Sam Rayburn). 
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United States' financial markets by imposing high levels of civil liabil­
ity upon sellers of securities.so During the decade following World 
War I, Americans purchased $50 billion worth of new-issue securi­
ties.s1 Unfortunately, one-half of those securities turned out to have 
little or no value.s2 There were two interdependent causes of this 
widespread purchase of valueless securities. First, to effectuate securi­
ties sales, high-pressure salesmen promised Americans easy wealth 
without educating them regarding the facts necessary to estimate the 
value of the securities.s3 Second, sellers convinced industries to meet 
the high demand for securities by accepting capital for unnecessary 
expansion purposes.s4 New securities were issued for public consump­
tion, not to finance justifiable industrial growth.ss As a consequence, 
many families lost their life savings in the stock market crash of 1929.56 
At that time, the United States was "farther behind than any other 
civilized nation . . . with respect to preserving the rights of the pur­
chasers of securities. "s7. 
The goals of the Securities Act in general, and section 11 in par­
ticular, favor applying the liberal notice pleading standard to section 
11 claims. The Securities Act imposes more responsibility on the 
50. "This proposal . . .  puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should 
give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence." Id. 
at 2 (President's Message to Congress). See also 77 CONG. REC. 2914 (1933) (statement of 
Rep. Greenwood): 
[T]he necessity for this legislation to help restore confidence in our local banking institutions 
is great .... There is a peculiar fact with respect to such investments in that the corporation 
that issues the securities knows more about them than anyone else, and the old rule of caveat 
emptor, or the buyer beware, certainly should not apply to this character of investments. 
The man who sells them ought to give the facts, and the Government ought to require the is­
suer of securities to give all the facts, and be honest with the public. 
51. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 1 ,  at 2. 
52 See id. 
53. See id. Before the stock market crash of 1929, Americans lived in a "gambler's civi­
lization," in which they believed they could make more money gambling in the market than 
through honest business. See 77 CONG. REC. 2914 (1933) (statement of Rep. Greenwood). 
54. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 1, at 2. 
55. See id. 
56. "In spite of many State [securities] statutes the public in the past has sustained se­
vere losses through practices neither ethical nor honest on the part of many persons and 
corporations selling securities." Id. at 1 (President's Message to Congress). 
57. 77 CONG. REC. 2912 (1933) (statement of Rep. Mapes). Much of the Securities Act 
was modeled after the English Companies Act of 1929. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 
1, at 9. Although many states had already passed blue sky laws, these laws did not address 
the concerns of the Securities Act. State laws controlled only the registration of securities 
and not the registration of offerings of securities. The investigation following the stock mar­
ket crash of 1929 revealed that the "system as a whole ... had failed miserably." James M. 
Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 
(1959). 
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seller than the buyer of registered securities.�8 The purpose of the Se­
curities Act is to. provide greater protection to purchasers of registered 
securities by requiring sellers to "provide full and fair disclosure of the 
character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and 
through the mails."59 In short, the aim of the Securities Act is to pro­
tect buyers by discouraging misleading statements. In contrast to the 
traditional contractual idea of cavea.t emptor, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt emphasized that under the Securities Act "the seller [must] 
also beware."60 Therefore, placing a lower burden on section 11 plain­
tiffs effectuates the purpose of the Securities Act: protection of the 
buyer at the expense of the seller. 
To protect buyers through full and accurate disclosure, section 11 
imposes civil liability with stringent penalties for false or misleading 
statements.61 Section 11 provides for joint and several liability for 
every person who prepares and/or signs registration statements.62 Sec­
tion 11 creates an incentive for sellers to comply with the Securities 
Act by imposing virtually absolute liability on parties directly involved 
in a registered offering for misstatements or omissions in the registra­
tion statement.63 According to the economic theory upon which secu­
rities regulation is premised, any misstatement or omission tends to 
over- or understate the price of a security, making all purchasers vic­
tims of the misstatement.64 By imposing more responsibility on sellers 
and providing for virtually absolute liability for material misstate­
ments, it is clear that Congress intended to discourage material mis-
58. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in recommending the Securities Act, said that it 
"puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller." H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, supra note 
1, at 2. Also note that the President did not mention fraud when recommending the Securi­
ties Act. See id. at l-2. 
59. H.R. 5480, 73d Cong. § 1 (1933). President Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, specifi­
cally stated that "the Federal Government cannot and should not take any action which 
might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in 
the sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties which they represent will 
earn profit." H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 1, at 2. 
60. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 1, at 2. 
61. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1967). 
62 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994); see also Laylin K. James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32 
MICH. L. REV. 624, 649 (1934). The strict liability characteristics of section 11 created con­
siderable controversy among members of the House of Representatives and Senate. See 
Landis, supra note 57, at 48 (noting that the Senate Amendment imposed an insurer's liabil­
ity upon the seller; whereas the House amendment measured section 11 liability under a rea­
sonable care standard). Nevertheless, the Securities Act passed both houses with no sub­
stantial opposition and became law on May 27, 1933. See H.R. 5480, supra note 1, § 1; see 
also Landis, supra note 57, at 49. 
63. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 1, at 10 (stating "[t]he connection between the 
statements made and the purchase of a security is clear, and, for this reason, it is the essence 
of fairness to insist upon the assumption of responsibility for the making of these state­
ments"). 
64. See Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due 
Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1009-11 (1984). 
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statements. The application of a heightened pleading standard is dia­
metrically opposed to Congress's stated purpose.65 
C. The Policies Behind F.R.C.P. Rule 9(b) 
Not only do the history and purpose of section 11 favor a lesser 
pleading standard, but the policy goals of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure also dictate that the notice pleading standard of Rule 
8(a)(2), not the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), apply 
to section 11 claims. Section I.C argues that because the policy ration­
ales behind Rule 9(b) are not relevant to section 11 claims and be­
cause the policy rationales for Rule 8(a)(2) do apply, Rule 8(a)(2) 
should govern section 11 claims. 
None of the policy arguments justify applying a heightened plead­
ing standard to section 11 claims. Traditionally, courts state that a 
heightened pleading requirement serves the following functions: (1) 
to provide notice to the defendant and allows the defendant to pre­
pare a response; (2) to protect a defendant's reputation from the dam­
age of charges involving some degree of moral turpitude; and (3) to 
minimize the impact of strike suits.66 
The first argument, that a heightened pleading standard provides 
the defendant with sufficient notice to prepare an effective response, is 
not persuasive. Rule 9(b) would be mere surplusage if its only func­
tion were to notify defendants of the plaintiff's claims, which Rule 8( a) 
already requires.67 While the heightened requirements of Rule 9(b) 
provide more specific notice, courts have not required more particu­
larized notice in a section 11 action.68 For example, in In re Bank­
America Corporation Securities Litigation,69 the plaintiff alleged that 
the issuer (a bank) violated section 11 by falsely characterizing its 
merger with another bank as a "merger of equals" in its registration 
statement.70 The court allowed the plaintiffs to support their claim -
65. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 1, at 3-10 {indicating that the purpose of the 
Securities Act was to provide investors with information necessary to make an informed 
purchase decision). 
66. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1296; see also Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 
1097, 1100 {5th Cir. 1994) (applying Rule 9{b) to a section 11 claim because the heightened 
pleading standard provides notice of the plaintiff's claims to the defendant, protects defen­
dants' reputation, and reduces the number of strike suits); Bernstein v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 
702 F. Supp. 962, 976 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (explaining the three policy reasons for requiring sec­
tion lO{b) plaintiffs to plead their claims with particularity). 
67. See Decker v. Glenfed, Inc. (In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th 
Cir. 1994) ("Rule 9(b) would clearly be superfluous if its only function were to ensure that 
defendants are provided with that degree of notice which is already required by Rule 8(a). "). 
68. See Carlon v. Thaman (In re NationsMart Sec. Litig.), 130 F.3d 309, 315 (8th Cir. 
1997). 
69. 78 F. Supp. 2d 976 (E.D. Mo. 1999). 
70. See id. at 986. 
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that the banks never intended the transaction to be a "merger of 
equals" - with anonymous quotes from The Wall Street Journal.11 
Very little is required to comply with Rule 8(a)(2). Therefore, the no­
tice requirement does not support requiring section 11 plaintiffs to 
plead their claims with particularity.72 Rule 8(a)(2) provides a defen­
dant with sufficient notice of the charges against him.73 
Furthermore, other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide pro­
tection for the defendant if the complaint fails to provide adequate no­
tice. The defendant may move for a more definite statement under 
Rule 12(e).74 The defendant may also file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim, which would force the plaintiff to 
explain her claim or have the case dismissed.75 Finally, the defendant 
could file a Rule 56(c) motion for summary judgment that would com­
pel the plaintiff to respond or lose her claim.76 
Likewise, the second argument that is typically given to support a 
heightened pleading standard, protecting the defendant's reputation, 
does not support applying this standard to section 11 claims for two 
reasons. First, a section 11 claim does not involve the type of moral 
turpitude that may tarnish a defendant's reputation.77 Because a de­
fendant may be found liable under section 11 for a completely inno­
cent misstatement or omission,78 section 11 does not harm a defen­
dant's reputation sufficiently to justify the application of Rule 9(b ).79 
71. See id. at 985 (quoting The Wall Street Journal). 
72 See Carlon v. Thaman (In re NationsMart Corp. Sec. Litig.), 130 F.3d 309, 315 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (stating that it would be superfluous to require plaintiffs to plead more than what 
is required to recover under section 11); see also First Merchants Acceptance Corp. Sec. 
Litig., No. 97-C2715, 1998 WL 781118, at *11 n.6 (N.D. ill. Nov. 4, 1998) ("It is illogical to 
require plaintiffs to plead more than they would have to prove to succeed on a § 11 claim."). 
73. See Conley v. Gibson 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (stating that Rule 8(a)(2) requires a 
statement "that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the 
grounds upon which it rests"); see also Maty v. Grasselli Chem. Co., 303 U.S. 197, 200 (1938) 
(rejecting pleading as a game of skill and accepting that the purpose of pleading is to facili­
tate a proper decision on the merits). 
74. FED. R. av. P. 12(e). 
75. FED. R. av. P. 12(b)(6). 
76. FED.Rav. P. 56(c). 
77. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1296 (explaining the rationale for imposing 
a heightened pleading standard for averments of fraud or mistake). 
78. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983). 
79. Rule 9(b) has been applied to a variety of lawsuits, including claims under the False 
Claims Act, Patent Act, and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 
See, e.g. , Brannon v. Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc. 952 F. Supp. 1478, (W.D. Okla. 1997) (re­
quiring all elements of a RICO to be plead according to Rule 9(b) because of the potential 
damage to a defendant's reputation and the possibility of treble damages); EMC Corp. v. 
Storage Tech. Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1261 (D. Del., 1996) (applying Rule 9(b) to averments of 
inequitable conduct in obtaining patent); United States ex rel. DeCarlo v. Kiewit/AFC En­
ters., 937 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dealing with the False Claims Act). 
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Second, even if a section 11 lawsuit causes damage to the defen­
dant's reputation, any harm that accrues to a defendant's reputation 
from a violation of the Securities Act is an effect implicitly intended 
by Congress to further compliance with the securities laws.80 Because 
every lawsuit has the potential to tarnish the defendant's reputation, 
the mere possibility of harm to a defendant's reputation does not sup­
port applying the heightened pleading standard to section 11 claims.81 
Courts have held that "only a defendant facing the particular threat 
that is posed by an accusation of fraud may invoke the protection of 
Rule 9(b )."82 Congress intended section 11 to ensure compliance with 
the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act and to make the 
public aware of sellers who did not comply with its requirements.83 
The third and final common rationale for applying a heightened 
pleading standard, deterring strike suits, must also fail because Con­
gress designed section 11 to encourage meticulous preparation of reg­
istration statements.84 Because Congress addressed the possibility of 
strike suits in the context of a section 11 claim by providing for attor­
neys' fees and costs, imposition of the heightened pleading standard of 
Rule 9(b) would be redundant.85 Further, because section 11 provides 
other procedural protections against strike suits,86 imposing a height­
ened pleading standard would do nothing more than place a more on­
erous burden on plaintiffs than Congress intended. In enacting section 
11, Congress did not seek to minimize frivolous lawsuits, but instead 
wanted to ensure compliance with its disclosure requirements by 
placing virtually absolute liability on sellers in order to discourage 
misleading disclosures.� 
General public policy considerations also favor applying Rule 
8(a)(2) rather than Rule 9(b) to section 11 claims. Since Rule 9(b) 
does not provide an explicit standard for determining what details 
must be included in a complaint, applying the heightened pleading 
80. The stock market crash of 1929 caused the public to lose faith in the securities indus­
try; Congress intended civil liability under section 11 to restore the public's faith in the fi­
nancial system. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 1, at 9-10. 
81. See Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 583, 595 (E.D. Mich. 1985). 
82 Consumers Power, 105 F.R.D. at 595. 
83. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 1, at 9-10. 
84. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1296 {2d ed. 1990) (explaining the rationale 
behind imposing a heightened pleading standard for averments of fraud or mistake). 
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 77{k){e) (1994). One court noted that "the principal purpose of§ 
ll(e) is to deter plaintiffs from bringing meritless actions solely to procure a favorable set­
tlement." Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 290 (3rd Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 
86. See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
87. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 1, at 9; see also Silver v. New York Stock Ex­
change, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) (favoring "an analysis which reconciles the operation of 
both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted"), 
quoted in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 n.23 (1983). 
June 2000] Section 11 Pleading 2409 
standard may create confusion.88 Plaintiffs' lawyers may produce pro­
lix complaints that would increase costs and burden the courts.89 More 
importantly, judicial uncertainty may lead to unfair dismissals, under­
mine the purpose of the Securities Act, and allow issuers to sell securi­
ties with materially misleading registration statements, which in turn 
will decrease the faith of investors in the United States' securities 
markets.90 
The text and purpose of the Securities Act and the policies em­
bedded in the Federal Rules support imposing the liberal notice 
pleading standard on section 11 plaintiffs. Because the plain language 
of section 11 does not include fraud or mistake, courts should not ap­
ply the heightened pleading standard to section 11 claims. Further­
more, the purpose of section 11 - to ensure compliance with the dis­
closure requirements of the Securities Act - mandates a minimal 
pleading standard for the plaintiff and a correspondingly heavier bur­
den for the defendant. Finally, the policy rationales behind Rule 9(b) 
do not apply to section 11 claims because the Securities Act provides 
other procedural protections to serve these goals. 
II. COMPARISON OF SECTION 11 WITH SECTION lO(b) 
A comparison between section 11 of the Securities Act and section 
lO(b) of the Exchange Act demonstrates that Rule 9(b) should not 
apply to section 11 claims. The differences between these distinct 
causes of action are important because securities lawsuits often en­
compass claims under both sections.91 Although the two sections rep­
resent interrelated components of federal securities regulation, Con­
gress and President Franklin D. Roosevelt intended them to address 
different types of wrongdoing.92 Section II.A argues that the statutory 
88. See, e.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990) (attempting to 
provide a standard for what is required in a securities pleading). 
89. See Decker v. Glenfed, Inc. (In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig.) 42 F.3d 1541, 1555-57 
(9th Cir. 1994) (Norris, J., concurring). 
90. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 1, at 9; see also The Common Sense Legal Re­
form Act: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. And Fin., 104th Cong. 
280 (1995) (statement of Mark J. Griffin, Director, Securities Division, Utah Department of 
Commerce). 
91. See, e.g., Carlon v. Thaman (In re NationsMart Sec. Litig.), 130 F.3d 309 (8th Cir. 
1997); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 1996); Shaw v. Digital Equip. 
Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1994); In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d at 1546; Shapiro v. 
UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1992). 
92 See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381 (1983). President 
Roosevelt commented that the Securities Act was "but one step in [the] broad purpose of 
protecting investors and depositors. It should be followed by legislation relating to the bet­
ter supervision of the purchase and sale of all property dealt in on exchanges, and by legisla­
tion to correct unethical and unsafe practices on the part of officers and directors of banks 
and other corporations." H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 1, at 2. The Exchange Act was 
enacted the following year and was primarily directed at disclosure after securities have been 
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language of sections 11 and lO(b) requires application of different 
pleading standards. Section II.B contends that applying a lower 
pleading standard to section 11 claims than to section lO(b) claims 
comports with recent congressional activity regarding the pleading 
standard for claims filed under section lO(b ). 
A. Section 11 and Section 1 O(b) Address Different Wrongs 
A comparison of the statutory language of section 11 and section 
lO(b) demonstrates congressional intent to treat the two sections as 
independent causes of action. First, section 11 applies to a more lim­
ited number of potential claims than does section lO(b ). While a 
heightened pleading standard may be needed to limit section 10(b) 
claims, it is not required to limit section 11 claims. Second, unlike 
those of section 10(b ), section 11 claims do not require proof of scien­
ter and reliance; therefore, courts should not impose the heightened 
pleading standard of Rule 9(b) on section 11 plaintiffs. Finally, be­
cause section 11 provides additional procedural protections that per­
form the same screening functions as a heightened pleading standard, 
it makes sense to apply a heightened pleading standard to claims filed 
under section lO(b) but not to those filed under section 11. 
The statutory language qf section 10(b) and section 11 supports the 
argument that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) should apply only 
to section lO(b) claims. First, section 11 provides an express private 
action, whereas under section lO(b ), the cause of action is implied. 93 
The express-versus-implied distinction is important because courts in­
terpret the statutory language of section 11 to limit claims in three 
ways: (1) to constrain the range of potential plaintiffs; (2) to limit the 
reach of possible defendants; and (3) to lessen the kinds of documents 
covered by the rule.94 By contrast, the judicially created cause of ac­
tion under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-595 constitutes a "catchall" 
antifraud provision.96 Courts, accordingly, imply a broad range of 
claims under section lO(b ),97 including fraudulent transactions,98 
issued. See GEORGE D. CAMERON III & PHILLIP J. SCALEITA, JR., BUSINESS LAW AND 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENTS 821 (5th ed. 1996). 
93. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994), with 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-
5. See also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976) (stating that section lO(b) is "a judicially implied liabil­
ity"). 
94. See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382. 
95. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1999). Pursuant to Section lO(b) of the Exchange Act, 
Congress authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), which is a federal 
agency charged with administering the securities laws, to promulgate Rule lOb-5. See, e.g. , 
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (explaining the relationship be­
tween Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5). 
96. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980). 
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churning,99 unsuitable investment,100 insider trading,101 and tipping.102 
Because Rule 9(b) pleading is meant to limit the number of claims 
that can be brought, its protections should be applied only to broad 
causes of action. Because courts already interpret section 11 to en­
compass a limited sphere, Rule 8(a)(2) serves to effectuate the pur­
pose of section 11: to provide full and complete disclosure of regis­
tered securities. 
Section 11 grants a private cause of action to a different class of 
plaintiffs than section lO(b) covers. Section 11 grants purchasers of 
securities an express civil cause of action for material misstatements 
and omissions in registration statements.103 In contrast, a wide range 
of potential purchasers may bring a claim under the judicially implied 
cause of action under section 10(b):104 Any purchaser of a security 
may bring a section lO(b) action against any person who has used "any 
manipulative or deceptive device" in connection with the sale of a se­
curity.105 The different scope of potential plaintiffs justifies applying 
variant pleading standards to the sections. Rule 9(b) serves to limit 
the ability of a wide range of plaintiffs to bring claims under section 
lO(b ). The statutory scope of section 11 already performs this limiting 
function; and therefore, Rule 8(a)(2), not Rule 9(b), should apply to 
section 11 claims. Applying Rule 9(b) to section 11 claims would 
97. See CAMERON & SCALETIA, supra note 92, at 822 (stating that section lO(b) "covers 
much more than just common law fraud, including such things as failure to comply with 
other securities law requirements, arbitrary withholding of dividends, breaches of fiduciary 
duty, and disclosure of too much or too little information"). 
98. See, e.g. , In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F3d 696 (3d Cir. 1996). 
99. See, e.g. , Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 90 (2d Cir. 1983) (defining churning as 
a "synonym for 'overtrading' "). 
100. See, e.g. , Clark v. John Larnula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(suggesting that an unsuitable investment constitutes a section lO(b) violation). 
101. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997). 
102 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 650-52 (1983). 
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(k){a) (1994); see also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 
U.S. 375, 381 {1983). Section 11 includes a tracing requirement (to be decided at trial by the 
fact finder), which requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that their shares were issued pursuant 
to the ostensibly defective public offering. See Bernstein v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 
962, 972 {E.D.N.Y. 1988). Cf. Versyss Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 982 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 
1992) (stating that a corporation that acquired securities through a merger did not "pur­
chase" the securities within the meaning of section 11). In contrast, section lO(b) does not 
contain a tracing requirement. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1999). 
104. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1999). 
105. Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 382. "While the 1933 Act regulates the initial 
sales of securities, the 1934 Act regulates the 'secondary market' - trades that occur after 
the issuer sells the stock to the public." WILLIAM A. KLEIN & J. MARK RAMSEYER, 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: AGENCY, PAR1NERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 442 (3d ed. 
1997). Presumably, a \vider range of individuals purchase securities in the second-hand mar­
ket than through initial public offerings. 
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overrestrict relief to buyers, thus frustrating congressional intent in 
enacting section 11. 
Section 11 enumerates a limited range of potential defendants, 106 
while section 10(b) does not.107 Because the heightened pleading re­
quirements of Rule 9(b) may be required to provide adequate notice 
to defendants, it is significant that section 11 lists all possible defen­
dants and their connection to the registration statement.103 Because 
the class of defendants is limited, a complaint complying with the re­
quirements of Rule 8(a)(2) provides sufficient notice to all defendants. 
Section 10(b ), however, provides a vague reference to conceivable de­
fendants.109 A section 10(b) plaintiff may have purchased the security 
in the second-hand market, and may even have a claim against some­
one other than the issuer.110 Therefore, Rule 9(b) is necessary to en­
sure adequate notice to section 10(b) defendants. 
The statute limits section 11 claims to material misstatements or 
omissions in registration statements.111 Section 10(b) claims, however, 
may be based on material misstatements or omissions in other docu­
ments, or oral communications.112 The Exchange Act requires section 
10(b) plaintiffs alleging a misleading statement or omission to "specify 
each statement alleged to have been misleading [and] the reason or 
reasons why the statement is misleading."113 The broader range of po-
Id. 
106. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994) provides a cause of action against: 
(1) every person who signed the registration statement; (2) every person who was a director 
of . . .  or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing . . .  (3) every person who, with his con­
sent, is named in the registration statement as being or about to become a director . . .  or 
partner; (4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser . . .  who has with his consent been 
named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement . . .  [and] (5) 
every underwriter with respect to such security. 
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994) (stating that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, di­
rectly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of 
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . .  [t]o use or employ, in con­
nection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange 
or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance . . .  ") 
(emphasis added). 
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994) . 
109. 15 u.s.c. § 78j (1994). 
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994). 
111. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994). 
112 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 
860 (2d Cir. 1968) (noting the wide applicability of section lO(b) to "the device employed, 
whatever it might be"). 
113. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4 (1999) (codifying section 220 of the Exchange Act covering 
private securities litigation). Section 27 of the Securities Act closely parallels section 220 of 
the Exchange Act; however, it does not contain provisions setting forth the heightened 
pleading requirements or those providing for dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply 
with the pleading requirements. Compare 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1 (1994), with 15 U.S.C.A. § 
78u-4 (1994). 
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tential bases for a section lO(b) claim may justify applying the height­
ened pleading standard. It is easier to determine the merits of a sec­
tion 11 complaint because it requires a court to focus on only the regis­
tration statement and not on other documents or forms of 
communication. 
Not only is there a difference in scope between the sections, the 
elements comprising section 11 and section lO(b) claims differ. Be­
cause section 11, unlike section lO(b ), does not require the plaintiff to 
specify "the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading,"114 
pleading with particularity under Rule 9(b) should be limited to sec­
tion lO(b) claims. Section 11 does not require proof of reliance115 be­
cause the Securities Act presumes causation between a material mis­
statement or omission and the market price, so section 11 plaintiffs do 
not have to specifically plead that they read the registration state­
ment.116 Section lO(b ), in contrast, requires th� plaintiff to prove rea­
sonable reliance and causation; therefore, application of a heightened 
pleading standard is important to ensure compliance with these ele­
ments.117 Finally, section 11 does not include a scienter requirement, 
while section lO(b) does.118 Because a section 11 plaintiff does not 
have to show intent to defraud, Rule 9(b) does not apply. 
A final distinction between the two sections is that section 11 and 
section 10(b) provide different procedural protections against frivo­
lous lawsuits. Accordingly, it is reasonable to apply different pleading 
requirements to the plaintiffs. Instead of using a heightened pleading 
standard to deter frivolous lawsuits, courts, in their discretion, may re­
quire section 11 plaintiffs to post bond to cover the costs of the law­
suit.119 The bond requirement may deter frivolous suits because plain­
tiffs will not post bond for cases that they cannot win. This procedural 
114. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4 (1999). See Kensington Capital Management v. Oakley, Inc., 
No. SA CV 97-808-GLT(EEx), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 385, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1999). 
115. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994); see also Anderson v. Qow (In re Stac Blee. Sec. 
Litig.), 89 F.3d 1399, 1404 (9th Cir. 1996). 
116. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, supra note 1, at 10. 
117. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5; Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood 
Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1991). 
118. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 382 (1983) ("[A] Section 
lO(b) plaintiff carries a heavier burden than a Section 11 plaintiff. Most significantly, he 
must prove that the defendant acted with scienter."). 
119. See id. at 384 n.18 (noting that "each of the express civil remedies in the 1933 Act 
allowing recovery for negligent conduct [as opposed to requiring proof of scienter] is subject 
to procedural restrictions not applicable to a § lO(b) action"). Similarly, 
the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such 
suit, including reasonable attorney's fees, and if judgment shall be rendered against a party 
litigant, upon the motion of the other party litigant, such costs may be assessed in favor of 
such party litigant (whether or not such undertaking has been required) if the court believes 
the suit or the defense to have been without merit 
15 U .S.C. § 77K( e) (1994). 
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restriction serves the same purpose as a heightened pleading standard: 
to deter frivolous lawsuits. 
In sum, even though section 11 and section 10(b) overlap in some 
respects, they represent distinct causes of action;120 and therefore, it is 
reasonable to apply a different pleading standard to each section. 
B. Impact of Recent Congressional Activity 
Congress specifically addressed the pleading standard for claims 
brought under section 10(b) in both the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") and the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998 ("SUSA").121 Neither of the two recent Acts 
affect the pleading standard for claims filed under section 11 of the 
Securities Act.122 Because the legislative history of the PSLRA and 
SUSA illustrates congressional awareness of judicial confusion over 
the pleading standard for securities cases, it is significant that Congress 
addressed the pleading standard under section 10(b) but not under 
section 11.123 The PSLRA altered the procedure, but not the sub­
stance, of securities fraud cases.124 While legislative inaction has been 
criticized as a canon of statutory construction, "legislative action by 
amendment . . . with respect to other parts of a law which have re­
ceived a contemporaneous and practical construction may indicate 
approval of interpretations pertaining to the unchanged and unaf-
120. See Hennon & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 383. 
121. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended at various sections of 15 U.S.C.); Securities Litigation Uniform Stan­
dards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
77(JJ) and§ 78(bb)). 
122. The PSLRA added section 27 to the Securities Act and section 21D to the 
Exchange Act. Section 27 and section 21 D are similar in that they include provisions re­
garding private actions under both Acts. While section 21D specifically addresses the 
heightened pleading requirement for section lO(b) claims, section 27 does not contain a par­
allel provision regarding the pleading standard for section 11 claims. Compare 15 U.S.C.A. § 
77z-1, with 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4. See generally 140 CONG. REC. S3695 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 
1994 (statement of Sen. Dodd) (examining the purpose of the PSLRA); see also Matthew 
Roskoski, Note, A Case-By-Case Approach to Pleading Scienter under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2265, 2267 (1999) (discussing the pleading 
requirements for section 10(b) claims). 
123. See NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A SUTHERLAND STAT CONS § 49.10 (4th ed. 1984); see 
also Edmonds v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266-267 (1979) (de­
scribing "silence" as "most eloquent, for such reticence while contemplating an important 
and controversial change in existing law is unlikely"); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal 
Phann. Corp. 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1311 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that Congress knows how to 
"supplant a judicially-created rule .. . explicitly"). 
124. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 66 (1995). Section lO(b) cases are thought to be "fraud " 
cases. See KLEIN & RAMSEYER, supra note 105, at 442. 
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fected parts of the law."125 In enacting the PSLRA and SUSA, Con­
gress could have, but did not, address the pleading standard applicable 
to claims filed under section 11. 
Some courts have indicated that the same policy considerations 
that favor applying Rule 9(b) to section 10(b) claims apply to section 
11.126 When Congress altered the requirements for pleading a section 
10(b) securities fraud claim under the Exchange Act, it did not change 
the pleading standard under section 11.127 The changes included the 
following section: 
Requiring that scienter be pied with particularity. 
The objective: To provide filter at the pleading stage to screen out alle­
gations that have no factual basis; To provide clearer statement of plain­
tiffs' claims and scope of the case; To encourage attorneys to use greater 
care in drafting their complaints; Make it easier to win motions to dismiss 
frivolous cases by requiring that scienter be pied with particularity. 
Eliminate the split among Circuits dealing with pleading requirements 
for scienter. To codify the requirements in the 2nd and 7th Circuits.128 
Congress's explicit invocation of Rule 9(b) in section 10(b ), coupled 
with the failure to similarly address section 11, demonstrates that 
Congress did not intend Rule 9(b) to apply to section 11 claims.129 As 
stated in the text of the Act, the PSLRA was designed, in part, to re­
solve disagreement among circuits over the pleading requirements for 
section 10(b) claims.130 During this same time period, and in many of 
125. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988) ("Quite obviously, reenacting 
precisely the same language would be a strange way to make a change."); Edmonds, 443 U.S. 
at 266-267. 
126. See Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1100 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that plaintiff's al­
legations of issuer's, accountants', and underwriters' purposeful misrepresentations for the 
purpose of making money were insufficient to sustain a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' section 
11 and section lO{b) claims for failure to plead with particularity). In securities fraud cases, 
"[ a]t a rnininlum Rule 9(b) requires allegations of the particulars of time, place, and contents 
of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresenta­
tion and what he obtained thereby." Shushany v. Allwaste, Inc., 992 F.2d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 
1993); see also DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that the 
particularity requirement "means the who, what, when, where, and how: the first paragraph 
of any newspaper story"). 
127. Compare 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1 (1994), with 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4 (1994). 
128. 140 CONG. REC. S3695 (daily ed. March 24, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
129. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 510 (1973). 
Legislative "inaction" in amending a statute to comport with this Court's evaluation of 
"[s]ound judicial administration" hardly warrants the disingenuous reading of a previous de­
cision to achieve the result that Congress, despite judicial prodding, has refused to mandate. 
However impatient we may be with a federal statute which sometimes may fail to provide a 
remedy for every situation, one would have thought it inappropriate for the Court to amend 
the statute by judicial action. 
Id. (citations omitted) (alteration in original). See also SINGER, supra note 123, § 49.10. 
130. See 140 CONG. REC. S3695 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dodd); see 
also Roskoski, supra note 122, at 2267-68 (listing various interpretations of the application of 
Rule 9(b) to section lO(b) claims, including In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 
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the same cases, a circuit split existed regarding the application of Rule 
9(b) to section 11.131 Because scienter is not an element of a section 11 
claim, and the PSLRA does not affect section 11, judges should not 
read fraud into section 11 claims by requiring plaintiffs to plead with 
particularity.132 
Similarly, in November 1998, Congress enacted SUSA to resolve 
the continuing confusion regarding the pleading standard for section 
10(b) claims.133 Like the PSLRA, SUSA did not address the pleading 
standard for section 11 of the Securities Act.134 Until Congress specifi­
cally addresses the pleading standard applicable to section 11 claims, 
plaintiffs need only plead according to Rule 8(a)(2). 
As illustrated in this Part, section 11 and section 10(b) differ 
greatly in both statutory language and purpose. These differences dic­
tate that the liberal notice pleading standard should continue to apply 
to section 11 claims, while the heightened pleading standard should 
apply to section 10(b) claims as mandated by the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 11 plaintiffs should be required to plead their claims ac­
cording to the liberal notice pleading standard enumerated in Rule 
8(a)(2). Congress intentionally placed a low burden on section 11 
plaintiffs to facilitate full and fair disclosure of securities. Without 
civil liability, issuers will not comply with the Securities Act and the 
United States financial markets will suffer. Defendants should not be 
F.3d 1 41 0, 1418 {3d Cir. 1997); Decker v. Glenfed, Inc. (In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig.) 42 
F.3d 1 541 {9th Cir. 1994); Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 24 {1st Cir. 1992); and 
O'Brien v. Nat'! Prop. Analysts Partners, 936 F.2d 674, 676 {2d Cir. 1991)). The section 11 
circuit split was between the Seventh and Eighth circuits, on the one hand, and the First, 
Third, Fifth and Ninth circuits, on the other. See supra notes 10 through 1 2  and accompa­
nying text. Notably, the Second Circuit has yet to rule on the issue. See supra note 10. 
Therefore, it would be impossible to resolve a section 11 circuit split by "codify[ing] the re­
quirements in the 2nd and 7th Circuits." 140 CONG. REC. S3695 {daily ed. March 24, 1994) 
(statement of Sen. Dodd). 
131. Compare Carlon v. Thaman (In re NationsMart Sec. Litig.), 130 F.3d 309, 315 {8th 
Cir. 1 997) {holding that Rule 9{b) does not apply to section 11 claims), with Melder v. 
Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1100 n.6 {5th Cir. 1 994) {holding that Rule 9{b) applies to section 11 
claims that are "grounded in fraud"). 
132 See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564 {1988) ("[W]e make clear . .. that we 
do not think it appropriate to substitute for the formula that Congress has adopted any judi­
cially crafted revision of it."). 
133. See S. REP. 105-182, at 6-7 {1998). More specifically, SUS A enacted the same 
pleading standard for section lO{b) claims filed in state courts as in federal courts. See id. 
134. Rather, SUS A amended section 16 of the Securities Act, which deals with addi­
tional remedies and limitations on remedies. See 144 CONG. REC. H6119-0l (1998). Section 
16, however, does not address the pleading requirement under section 11. 
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able to avoid liability by easily dismissing a section 11 complaint for 
failure to plead with particularity. 
The differences in statutory language and legislative history of sec­
tion 11 and section lO(b) support applying a lower pleading standard 
to section 11 than to section lO(b) claims. Congress expressly directed 
section lO(b) of the Exchange Act, but not section 11 of the Securities 
Act, at fraudulent securities transactions. Congress recently reempha­
sized the fact that the heightened pleading standard applies to securi­
ties fraud cases under section lO(b) but not to claims under section 11 
when it enacted the PSLRA and SUSA. To protect investors and the 
integrity of the regulatory scheme, Rule 8(a)(2) should apply to sec­
tion 11 claims. 
